The claim that cognitive psychological explanations are indispensable to cognitive science may reflect an a priori constraint that we need not accept. I show why, and then go on to envisage one possible future for cognitive science, exemplified by neuroeconomics, in which explanation is physiological, and the psychology merely heuristic.
I am going to cover ground that relates to several of the questions that have been posed for this symposium, but rather than go over the terrain piecemeal, I will speak up for a way of thinking about the relationship between psychology and neuroscience that privileges the latter. "Speak up for", rather than "endorse": I think this family of ideas makes sense, but I am not going to suggest we should all believe it. However, I think it's worth taking it seriously, partly for scientific reasons, and partly because of broader cultural ones. Neuroscience has a lot of cultural capital, and will acquire more, so it's worth taking a closer look at one way of pushing its credentials against those of psychology.
I will not argue that the sciences of the mind can do without any cognitive or intentional psychology at all. But a body of concepts can be essential to the science without doing any explaining, as I shall try to show. I'll focus on neuroeconomics, and argue that phenomena described in intentional terms have two roles to play. First, they characterise what has to be explained, and second, they provide an ecological heuristic that shows how the underlying brain systems work within the life of our species; they show the underlying physiology can be understood. But the explanation of how the cognitive system works is a neurological one; the intentional or ecological description of the system is heuristic. The basic idea I will present can be summed up like this: psychologists have investigated the mind and discovered lots of very important effects. Any satisfactory theory of the mind needs to take these findings into account, and explain them. Intentional concepts are essential for showing how the physiology of the brain can be seen as solving these puzzles, by establishing the right context. But the intentional or psychological does not do any explaining on its own terms. The demand for an autonomous psychological level of explanation is gratuitous.
To begin with, then, let's consider the idea that without an intentional story we just don't have any real explanation. My response here is independent of my take on cognitive neuroscience, and has to do with general stances towards causation and explanation in any multi-level inquiry. I take this view to be exemplified by Chris Frith (1992 p.26) . Frith insists that even if we found a strong correlation between a spike in dopamine and delusions of thought insertion, such a correlation would be "simply not admissible" as an explanation of thought disorder. Why not? Frith plainly has constraints in mind on what counts as a legitimate explanation of psychosis, and I suppose the same constraints should apply to any other psychological trait. Frith judges that an explanation in terms of dopamine would leave us in the dark about why thought insertion, rather than something else, is the result of a sudden change in neurotransmitter physiology.
In fact, the attempt to explain schizophrenia in terms of dopamine alone has failed [the history is recounted, and morals drawn, in Kendler and Schaffner (forthcoming) ]. But suppose we established, with a high degree of confidence, relations between dopamine levels and the signs and symptoms that schizophrenics display You might think that a proper, counterfactual-supporting description of the relation between dopamine levels and thought insertion would give us just the kind of material basis that explanations in medicine have long sought. We would have isolated a physical process and specified what the psychological outcome of changes in the physiology would amount to. You might think that obviously, in that case, we would have a causal explanation of delusions of thought insertion.
Frith denies it. His reasoning is that although we have a relationship here between a physical process and some psychological outcomes, the relationship is not of the right type to count as an explanation. To show why thought insertion comes about, Frith thinks, we need a 'different level"; specifically, a cognitive story that shows us how thought insertion is caused by failures of normal subpersonal information processing.
The idea is that a causal explanation of a psychotic phenomenon must cite respectably cognitive variables in order to be explanatory. The relationship between dopamine and thought insertion is just opaque to reason, and we want variables that are related in ways that are transparent to reason. There is a constraint here; the idea that explanations of psychological phenomena should relate cause and effect in ways that we find intelligible. As Campbell (2008: 200) says in an insightful criticism of Frith that I am draw on here, talk of levels of explanation is often wheeled in at this point. A psychological level is supposed to realize causal relations that are transparent to reason in the right way. The idea is that only processes at a level let us to grasp explananda at that level; explanantia at a different level don't do the job, and so although lower-level processes may realise the higher ones they cannot explain them. This amounts to a constraint imposed on inquiry in advance. Frith insists a priori that causal relations must really have a certain set of properties, in the name of some metaphysical commitment or theory of explanation.
A correlation between deviant dopamine firing and thought insertion is, perhaps, just not satisfying, and we are driven to look for causal relations that fit our prior expectations about the behavior of the world. Psychological explanations are indispensable for that feeling of understanding.
But the response is obvious: explanation isn't about making you feel good. It has to do with uncovering the structure of the world: "we have to resist the demand for intelligibility", insists Campbell. (2008, 201) . It seems odd to demand that we give up intelligibility; you might expect such a remark at a meeting of the Derrida Society, but what's a paid-up analytic philosopher doing saying such things? To see the point, we have to understand what Campbell expects the explanations to look like, which is a causal relation revealed by patterns of correlation. Of course correlation doesn't equal causation, but correlations must have causal explanations -there is a reason why variables get correlated -and we can show that patterns of correlations must constrain, sometimes uniquely, the underlying causal possibilities (Spirtes et al 1993 , Pearl 2000 .
The result, though, is exactly what Frith finds epistemically unacceptable: we are left with correlations between variables at different levels of explanation that do not make it apparent why the causal relations exist. Other theorists have followed Frith in making similar denialsCraver and Bechtel (2007) just deny that causal relations across levels are possible.
The debate here turns on different ideas about what causal explanation must be like. For Campbell, following Woodward (2003) , our notion of causation is a matter of manipulation. If we intervene so as to effect one variable, and another variable changes in response, then we are dealing with a causal relation. This permits the sort of explanations that Frith will not allow to count as explanations at all -robust correlations between variables that we can manipulate experimentally (through interfering with dopamine levels, for example). These relations exist even though we cannot say why they exist We achive a kind of understanding, but we do not get the deepr explanation of why things rationally have to be that way, which is what Frith seems to want. Campbell (2008) appeals on this point to Hume's insistence that causal relations cannot be discerned a priori. They are simply discovered in nature. But the point is actually stronger -not only are causal relations not discoverable a priori, we should not expect even their a posteriori character to conform to our desires for rational intelligibility; Perhaps the only stable and consistent correlate of a psychological explanandum is a dopamine irregularity. In that case, we need to forget our a priori assumptions about what can cause what.
But could there really be a science of the mind that didn't have any cognitive psychology in it? No, but let's distinguish the idea of a psychological explanation from the idea of an intentional story about what a system does.
According to the cluster of ideas I am interested in here, the goal of the sciences of the mind is to uncover the underlying cognitive parts. The idea of decomposing human psychology into its components is shared by many research programs, but there are many putative ways to decompose the cognitive capacities of our species into its components. What is needed is a canonical decomposition that reveals the relevant explanatory structure. One way to do this would be to look for an abstract specification of human cognitive traits so as to produce a general picture of intelligence; this is the approach taken by David Marr (1982, (24) (25) ). I will go over this familiar terrain briefly as a foil against which a rival approach can be spelled out, one based on brain systems rather than cognitive architecture.
Marr wanted to understand psychological processes in the abstract without worrying about biology. He assumed that computational processes could be specified mathematically in the abstract and then realized in whatever physical and computational setup would ultimately duplicate human thought. So Marr distinguished three levels of explanation in cognitive science. The highest specifies the computational task accomplished by the system of interest. The middle level describes the particular information processing algorithms the system uses to solve that task. The lowest level tells us how brain tissue implements the algorithm.
Frankie Egan (1995 Egan ( , 2009 ) has drawn attention to how careful Marr is to urge that the theoretically important characterization of a system, from the point of view of a computational theory of cognition, is mathematical characterization. One of Egan's examples (2009: 20) is a component of Marr's model that carries out the initial filtering of the retinal image. To understand what the device does, you need to know that it computes the Laplacean convolved with the Gaussian (Marr 1982: 337) . More informally, its input consists of light intensity values at points in the retinal image and it calculates the rate of change of intensity over the image. The reason why that is an informal characterisation of the device is that the computational description is, as Egan says, canonical. From the computational perspective, it is irrelevant that input values represent light intensities whereas output values represent the rate of change of light intensity. The computational theory prescinds from any semantic interpretation of what the device is up to. Egan notes that although we may interpret some structures as representing visible edges in the environment the canonical characterization displays the filter's membership in a mathematical kind; a class of devices that intrinsically have no relation to vision. Exactly the same system might be a part of auditory processing or a parser, or something else.
To show how the abstractly characterized process realizes a cognitive capacity such as edge detection, we need to say what environment it functions in, and supply an intentional interpretation of the device. As Egan says (2009: 21) , "the questions that define a psychological theory's domain are typically couched in intentional terms." An intentional interpretation forms a bridge between the abstract, mathematical characterization of a computational device and the human abilities that the theory tries to explain -by characterising the device as an edge detector (or parser, or etc), we can show how it realises the human capacity we are trying to explain. But the intentional interpretation does not do the explaining; it takes the mathematical explanation of the cognitive widget and specifies its ecological relationships.
Marr left us with no guidelines about how to decompose the human cognitive repertoire into capacities which can then be modelled. This may not be a problem for a theorist looking for a computationally abstract specification of thought that is equivalent to a human being. But it is a problem if we are trying to understand what the actual human decomposition is; there is no a priori reason to think that we have evolved in such a way as to neatly decompose into tractable abstract computational systems with clearly defined engineering goals. So what might be the basis for a decomposition?
The neuroeconomic program I want to look at now assumes that the privileged decomposition of the human mind will be physiological. It will be driven by the search for brain systems that have cognitive jobs to do, rather than the search for abstract computational systems. The decomposition of psychological capacities marches in step with the identification of physical structures within the brain that realize the component capacities. Typically, crucial evidence is provided by the absence of cognitive abilities in a subject who has an anatomical or physiological deficit in some brain area. The process is one that, in Glymour's words (1992) discovers "cognitive parts"; the ensuing decomposition is a physiology that is intentionally described. We use psychological language to characterise what it is that connected regions of the brain do -what makes them a system with a function. Neuroeconomics aspires to a more formal treatment of this intentional specification. It employs a broadly decision-theoretic characterization of human beings as cognitive agents that describes the behaviour that we have to explain. That includes departures from that behaviour that we would expect a rational agent to display, as in the case of addiction.
So as an example of neuroeconomics, let's look at a recent treatment of addiction by Ross, Sharp, Vuchinich and Spurrett (2008) . The starting point is a set of behaviours that look puzzling from an economic standpoint, or more generally from any view of humans as fundamentally rational agents. For one thing, addicts "reverse preferences". That is, they expend resources trying to stay clean, and they also expend resources on their addiction. There are two reasons, relative to the naturalised theory of rational choice, why you might exhibit this pattern of behaviour. One reason is an increase in the relative value of short-term rewards as you approach them, so that they get more attractive the closer they are in time. Or you might simply underestimate the costs of withdrawal. Both of these seem to be true of humans, which raises a couple of puzzles. One is general; if these properties are shared by humans, why doesn't the pattern of behaviour associated with addiction show up across the board -in other words, why aren't we all addicted to all our preferred activities? A second puzzle is more specific; if anyone should be able to reliably estimate the costs of withdrawal it's former addicts, because they have been through withdrawal already. Yet addicts are more, not less, likely to get addicted in the future than the general population.
You could try to come up with a computational, or less formal, psychological model that would explain these findings. But Ross et al. think that a psychological model is just the wrong sort of thing to do the explanatory job, because the puzzling facts about addiction are explained by physiology. Specifically, they appeal to the operation of the dopaminergic system and its interaction with other systems. The dopaminergic system is of interest to Ross et al because it does the following: 1) learns environmental cues that predict reward 2) estimates comparative values of rewards 3) directs attention to cues that predict reward 4) prepares the system to act on those cues
The system is especially attracted to surprises, which are the basis of learning. Now, you will have noticed that the system, as presented, has a set of functions that are described in intentional terms. My point is that this is a description, not an explanation, of how the system operates. The explanation mixes chemical and intentional activity. The vental tegmental area and Pars compacta of the substantia nigra release dopamine in response to surprising magnitudes or learned contingencies. This implements learning: a flood of dopamine (in nucleus accumbens) tells your reward system that whatever it was attending to was better than expected. This sets up a feedback loop to direct further attention and cue the motor cortex to take action. Ross et al. argue that these properties jointly predict a system that will be captured by unpredictable shifts in small magnitudes.
But if this story explains addiction, why isn't everybody addicted, since we all have the system? Well, for one thing, the dopaminergic system can be restrained. It competes with other circuits (serotonergic and GABAnergic) that inhibit it, and recruits glutamate as an ally. Circuits in your frontal and prefrontal cortex inhibit impulsivity through the integration of cognition -which suppresses input to the reward system and plays a regulative role, and emotionespecially fear of risk.
More directly, not every sort of environmental contingency has the right profile. The system, argue Ross et al., is set up to be captured by surprises that are associated with reliable cues; their parade case is gambling. It's interesting that pathological gamblers have brains that resemble those of cocaine addicts. And coke is the drug that works most directly on the reward system. So why is gambling so addictive? Because in gambling you are in a situation designed to allow for small impulsive actions that cue completely reliably for unpredictable outcomes, and hence surprise. (So it is important that the odds are stacked against you by the house, because otherwise it wouldn't be surprising enough when you win).
So, on this view, there are competing systems that prevent us just becoming novelty seekers as we would if the dopamine system were in the driving seat. Furthermore, only some environmental contingencies track the relationship between reliable cue and unpredictable outcome that can capture the system, so the theory, if correct, explains why not every behaviour can be addictive. On a traditional economic model, you can get addicted to anything, and on a traditional reductive neurological account, you can only get addicted to some classes of drug. Ross et al think that we can use their model to end the dispute; addiction is a disorder of the dopamine system, but the system will only respond addictively to some stimuli, viz. those which combine a surprising range of outputs with a reliable cue for those outputs.
Furthermore, if we think in terms of competition between frontal and dopaminergic systems, we can see why some exposure to drugs leads to increased risk of addiction, thereby solving the second problem; why do addicts relapse? They relapse because of the physiological changes wrought by the addiction. Drugs themselves destroy cortical brain cells and rewire the system so as to render it less prone to inhibition from the frontal systems. Continuous floods of dopamine into nucleus accumbens depresses serotonin levels and reduce the inhibition of impulse. Stimulant drugs do this directly: they produce extra dopamine. Alcohol, nicotine and opiates work indirectly by disturbing neurotransmitter ratios. But all of them end up working on the brain so as to crowd out attention to stimuli that don't predict drugs, and direct attention to stimuli that do. Moreover, the addict's brain gets pre-wired for relapse because the brain is physically modified so as to be on the lookout for distinctive sensory predictors: glutamate, which increases in an extra-stimulating environment, rewires memory and learning to make the system better at detecting and tracking the addictive 'target'.
In these cases, the answers to psychological or behavioural questions, like "why do addicts relapse" is answered by appeal to brain chemistry; an explanation in terms of the motives or learning history of the addicts, for instance, will leave us in the dark.
Let me draw some morals. Psychology is indispensable in one sense to the story I just told, but not as a purveyor of explanations. As in Marr's case, the intentional parts of the story are heuristics, designed to help us grasp what the system is doing in the environment of interest, but the explanations, including the solutions to the puzzles about addiction, are physiological; they appeal to the nature of the dopamine system and its relationship to other systems. We can describe these systems in rough intentional terms-the (midbrain) learning system, the (frontal) executive system, but these are not explanatory descriptions. The explanation would lose none of its force if the intentional language were removed, but would cease to exist if we stripped away the vocabulary of systems neuroscience. Furthermore, there is no independent computational story -so even if we think of the intentional language as indispensable, it is not cognitive psychology that is playing a role, but a characterization of human action drawn from the social sciences by making the folk psychology of beliefs and utilities more sophisticated.
So if this picture of cognitive science spreads -and it may do even apart from its merits, given the prestige of both economics and neuroscience -we will see a science of the mind with decision theory at the top level, systems neuroscience at the bottom, and no cognitive psychology. Psychology discovers interesting stuff about human behaviour and, as in Marr's picture, connects the canonical description of the system (which is physiological in this case) to the context in which we want to understand it. You will recall that in Marr's work the computational story is canonical, and the intentional one is heuristic. I am suggesting that in the neuroeconomic story the intentional is again heuristic; it uncovers what needs to be understood (by discovering the relevant effects that serve as the explananda), and it connects the physiological story to the context. The intentional language helps us to understand what the dopamine system normally does, and shows how addiction is related to enduring states of the system. As on Marr's account, the intentional interpretation of the system is ecologically important and has a heuristic role to play, but is explanatorily inert. The system is explained by its neurochemistry. Cognitive psychology drops out of the picture; it has no existence as an independent explanatory level.
